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Joined: 13 Apr 2006
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 Posted: Sun May 21, 2006 10:43 am Post subject: NetSecL 1.3 is out |
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NetSecL 1.3 is out :). There are some important improvements in the security since ISlack 1.2. There are 2 Paranoia kernels 2.6.x and 2.4.x, they are very restrictive so please be carefull it is advisable to use them as a second kernel. I remind you that PaX Kernels are on CD 2, don't use the kernels from the bootme directory on CD 1 for a second kernel. Some of the libraries were recompiled so they can not use the stack, X was also recompiled and became a little bigger. Here are the results from paxtest:
bash-3.1# paxtest blackhat
Executable anonymous mapping : Killed
Executable bss : Killed
Executable data : Killed
Executable heap : Killed
Executable stack : Killed
Executable anonymous mapping (mprotect) : Killed
Executable bss (mprotect) : Killed
Executable data (mprotect) : Killed
Executable heap (mprotect) : Killed
Executable shared library bss (mprotect) : Killed
Executable shared library data (mprotect): Killed
Executable stack (mprotect) : Killed
Anonymous mapping randomisation test : 16 bits (guessed)
Heap randomisation test (ET_EXEC) : 13 bits (guessed)
Heap randomisation test (ET_DYN) : 25 bits (guessed)
Main executable randomisation (ET_EXEC) : 16 bits (guessed)
Main executable randomisation (ET_DYN) : 16 bits (guessed)
Shared library randomisation test : 16 bits (guessed)
Stack randomisation test (SEGMEXEC) : 23 bits (guessed)
Stack randomisation test (PAGEEXEC) : 24 bits (guessed)
Return to function (strcpy) : Vulnerable
Return to function (strcpy, RANDEXEC) : Vulnerable
Return to function (memcpy) : Vulnerable
Return to function (memcpy, RANDEXEC) : Vulnerable
Executable shared library bss : Killed
Executable shared library data : Killed
Writable text segments : Killed
The remaining vulnarabilities are ment to fail:
| Quote: | | protecting against this kind of attack in general is hard, but certain subtypes can be thwarted to an extent by randomization, stack layout changes (SSP and the like), etc. the general solution will need userland changes as outlined in the PaX future doc, but in the meantime and in the interest of not giving anyone a false sense of security, we included these tests and they are meant to fail. |
Reference:
http://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?t=1420&highlight=strcpy
There is also a default script with paxpermissions that is executade on the first boot to allow some kind of usability for the system when it is used with paranoia kernels so don't get scared if you get flooded with messages on the first boot. The list is still not full, but I hope to have it full for 1.4 and make all kernels paranoid.
Clamav, Klamav and Dazuko are there now - work perfect. For all other changes check the Changelog:
ftp://mirrors.unixsol.org/netsecl/Changelog.txt
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